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POLICY RECOMMENDATION REGARDING THE
INTERFACE BETWEEN THE PROTECTION OF
COMMERCIAL SECRECY AND THE RE-USE
OF PUBLIC SECTOR INFORMATION
by
RAZVAN DINCA*
In respect of the competing interests related to favoring re-use of PSI, on one side,
and protecting the commercial  secrecy, on the other side,  no reasonable  reasons
were identified to put in question the current perspective of EU law in its essential
aspect: as a rule, the access to PSI which derives private economic value from its
confidential nature should be barred to re-users; by exception, only if specific public
interest so requires, the confidential nature of the information may be set aside, but
in this case with adequate compensation for the affected legitimate interest related
to business secrecy. Such compensation might include obstacles to re-use, which are
limited in time, space and scope. 
From this perspective, the current wording of the Article 1, paragraph 2, letter c,
second line of the Directive 2003/98/CE which excludes from its scope „documents
which are  excluded from access  by virtue of  the  access  regimes in  the  Member
States, including on the grounds of statistical or commercial confidentiality” seems
adequate for two reasons. First, as a rule the confidentiality nature of the trade se-
crets determines, as a rule, an obstacle to access, and not merely to re-use. In these
cases, the obstacle to re-use is only a natural consequence of the obstacle to access.
Second, by exception, the access regime to confidential information may be more
liberal in consideration of specific public policies. Still, even in those cases, as a
compensation for the originator of the information, some limited restrictions may be
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imposed to re-use. Therefore, again, the restriction to re-use appears as a conse-
quence of the legal regime of access.
This provision however creates a side problem which has no solution of principle in
the EU Directive of PSI re-use. This problem is for the PSB to practically determine
which of the information reached under its control is of such a nature that it is enti -
tled to refuse third parties’ access for the purposes of re-use. In order to answer this
problem, the paper recommends a uniform set of guidelines to be adopted by the EU
Commission regarding the good practices of identifying and protecting the PSI in
which private parties have legitimate interests related to commercial secrecy.
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1. PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS: WHAT IS THE LAPSI 
FRAMEWORK?
The  legal  framework  to  consider  is  composed  on  one  side  of  Directive
2003/98/CE (PSI  Directive),  completed  with  the  Directives  no.  2007/2/EC
(INSPIRE Directive) and 2008/56/EC (MSF Directive), and on the other side
of EU fundamental principles embedded in Treaties and Conventions, in-
cluding the TRIPs agreement to which the European Union is a member.
Under the Article  1, paragraph 2, letter c,  second line of the Directive
2003/98/CE, this directive shall not apply to documents which are excluded
from access by virtue of the access regimes in the Member States, including
on the grounds of statistical or commercial confidentiality. 
Maintaining the protection of the commercial confidentiality is an obli-
gation undertaken by the European Union under the Article 39.2 of TRIPs
Agreement. According to this Article, natural and legal persons shall have
the possibility of preventing information lawfully within their control from
being disclosed to, acquired by, or used by others without their consent in a
manner contrary to honest commercial practices so long as such informa-
tion:
(a) is secret in the sense that it is not, as a body or in the precise config-
uration and assembly of its components, generally known among or
readily accessible to persons within the circles that normally deal
with the kind of information in question;
(b) has commercial value because it is secret; and
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(c) has been subject to reasonable steps under the circumstances, by the
person lawfully in control of the information, to keep it secret.
Those  normative  provisions  create  the  frame  for  solving  the  conflict
which might appear in case the public sector information (PSI) making ob-
ject of applications for re-use was collected by the public authority from pri-
vate holders which have legitimate interests in keeping the respective infor-
mation under a confidentiality regime.
This conflict is solved by excluding from the scope of the PSI directive
the documents held by the public sector bodies (PSBs) to which the access is
bared because those documents contain third parties’ confidential informa-
tion. 
The PSBs may hold such documents in cases when, in the exercise of
their public tasks, such bodies were granted access to private confidential
information. The PSBs will be entitled to such access only under a duty of
confidence. That means that they are bound to use the confidential informa-
tion only for the specific purpose of accomplishing the public task justifying
their entitlement to access that information. They are not allowed to use it
for other purposes, to disclose it to third parties or to grant such parties any
authorization to (re-)use.
Therefore, any application concerning such documents, addressed to the
PSBs by eventual re-users, will be dismissed on the grounds of protecting
third parties commercial secrecy interests. 
The purpose of this policy recommendation is to assess the capacity of
this solution to offer a reasonably fair and economically desirable balance of
the conflicting interests involved as well as the possibilities to improve it by
legal means to be implemented at EU level.
2. INTERESTS INVOLVED
2.1. FIRST OBJECT: MARKET DEVELOPMENT
As it is known, the legal means to stimulate the re-use of the PSI are pur-
ported to create  new information products  which  would determine  eco-
nomic growth and to contribute to the overall access to and dissemination
of information which should promote the scientific and cultural develop-
ment, public debate and democracy. 
On the other hand, the concept of trade secrets encompass very broad
categories of information such as know-how, industrial processes, market-
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ing strategies, software source codes, undisclosed TV formats, lists of clients
or suppliers and so on. Their common feature is that they derive an eco-
nomic  value  for  their  holder  from the  fact  of  being  secret,  because  this
holder will have a competitive advantage for being the single one or one of
the few that may use in their business an information that is not generally
known or readily accessible to his competitors. The national laws in Mem-
ber States generally provide sanctions for illicit access, disclosure or use of
the  confidential  information,  under  regimes  of  prevention  of  the  unfair
competition, of liability for tort or for breach of confidence. Generally, in
most  of  the EU countries,  as opposed to intellectual  property rights,  the
trade secrets are not protected by a real exclusivity but only by prohibition
of unfair ways to access, disclose or use the protected information. Also, the
duration of such protection is not pre-established but it usually lasts as long
as the holder takes the reasonable steps to ensure that the information is
confidential and the respective information is still not generally known or
not readily accessible to the business environment.
The rationale behind this type of “soft” protection relies on considera-
tions related to the economy of information. In the event that the law does
not prevent the unfair means to access, disclose or use the confidential in-
formation, the holder would invest in creating and developing factual ways
to prevent those means, while the potential free riders would invest in cir-
cumventing those factual ways. Such extensive lateral investments would
result in unjustified social cost. On the contrary, if the unfair means to ac-
cess, disclose or use the information are legally prevented, the holder will
be stimulated to produce such information while the third parties might in-
vest in reverse engineering it, which is an acceptable way of dissemination
of that information. Both the production and dissemination of incremental
technological information are socially desirable and they contribute to tech-
nical progress, economic growth and development of the competitive envi-
ronment. As for the business information (marketing, accounting, pricing
and so on), the production of this kind of information contributes to raising
the quality of the competition. The relative opacity of this information main-
tains the independent business conduct of the agents and prevents the mo-
nopolistic collusions. 1
1 See Landes, W., Posner, R., 2003, “The Economics of Trade Secrecy Law”, in The Economic
Structure of Intellectual Property Law, Harvard University Press
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2.2. SECOND OBJECT: PARTICIPATIVE DEMOCRACY
Beyond the market consideration exposed before, the re-use of PSI also rep-
resents a desirable way of dissemination of a kind of information which, in
one way or another, relates to the PSBs and therefore to public interest. Dis-
semination of public interest information contributes to development of a
general informed debate on public interest issues and thus consolidates the
participative democracy. Free access to such information contributes also to
non-discrimination both in the economic sense of a competitive market and
in the political sense of opened debate and public scrutiny on the decisions
and activities impacting the public interest. 
The protection of commercial secrecy is rarely confronted to this kind of
participative democracy concerns. This is because generally the information
covered by this protection is economically valuable, not necessarily politically
valuable. On the contrary when, by the way of exception, it is established
that keeping the information secret would adversely affect a specific legiti-
mate public interest, the disclosure of the information might be mandated
in order to protect the said interest, providing that the use of this informa-
tion by third parties is restricted in order to protect the legitimate (private)
interest of the originators. 
In other terms, the protection of a public interest may justify a limit to
the  protection  of  business  secrecy  but  such  limit  should  be  exceptional,
strictly necessary and proportionate to the importance of the public interest
protected. It is therefore to be expected that the mere public interest of open
debate will rarely set aside the interest to keep secret information which is
economic in nature and genuinely private. 
2.3. SUBJECTS: PSI PRODUCERS, HOLDERS, USERS AND RE-
USERS
The policies behind the protection of the confidential information on one
side and the liberalization of access and re-use of the PSI on the other side
engage various private and public interests.
The producers and holders of the trade secrets will seek for the protec-
tion of their investment. Their natural trend is to prolong the competitive
advantage offered by the information produced as a result of this invest-
ment. The limitation of such protection would become somehow arbitrary if
it  is  accepted that the compliance with an obligation to disclose it  to the
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public authority for purposes related to its public mission causes complete
loss of its economic value. Indeed, if, once disclosed to the authority, the in-
formation is freely accessible to any third party, including for re-use pur-
poses, it is not secret anymore and the source of economic value thus disap-
pear.
Of course third parties might be willing to find the trade secrets with one
competitor from the public authority to which this one was bound to trust
them. However, this free riding would create certain unfairness. As long as
the production of secret commercial information requires some investment,
while the access for re-use purposes will be liberalized, if the investor and
the re-user are equally free to use the resulting information, then the former
will  be placed in  a competitive disadvantage towards the later.  On long
term, either the investment in producing the incremental information will
be  discouraged  or  the  circumventing  conducts  will  be  encouraged,  the
holder of the secrets plausibly trying to avoid its communication to the pub-
lic authority.
Another very important interest to consider is the interest of the PSBs re-
lated to the management of the trade secrets disclosed to it. As long as the
qualification of certain PSI as trade secret entails legal regime consequences
as for the right/obligation of that PSB to not grant access to it, the PSB must
have an accurate evidence of what  is  commercial  secret  information and
what is not. The mere qualification given by the holder to his information
might be excessive and therefore it will generally not be sufficient for the
public  authority  to  accept  such  qualification.  Since  the  refusal  of  access
must be strictly confined to the trade secrets, the authority should be able to
assess if all legal requirements for such a qualification are accomplished in
respect  of  specific  information.  Such  assessment  however  involves  very
complex factual findings regarding for example to the level of knowledge or
ease of access that the competitors of the holder enjoy in respect of the infor-
mation,  its  ability  to  procure  economic  value  to  the  holder,  the  overall
holder’s conduct towards the information and so on. Moreover, all  those
circumstances are dynamic and information which was trade secret at the
moment when it was trusted to the PSB might become public knowledge at
the date when the application for access or re-use is made. This is why a
complex system of classification and management of the information should
be put in place and solutions have to be found in order to allocate the costs
involved by such a system to those who actually take advantage of it.
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3. INTERESTS PROTECTED WITH THE CURRENT LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK 
In the conflict between the beneficial effects of re-use and those of the legal
protection of trade secrets, Article 1, paragraph 2, letter c, second line, of the
Directive 2003/98/CE prefers this later protection. It puts out of the scope of
the directive any commercial secret information excluded from public ac-
cess by virtue of the access regimes of the Member States. 
Moreover, other EU law sources create access restrictions grounded on
commercial secrecy in respect of the information trusted to the EU and EEA
PSBs. For example, according to Article 28.1 of the Regulation no. 1 on the
implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82
of the Treaty, the information collected by the Commission during the in-
vestigation it performs within its antitrust attributions shall be used only for
the purpose for which it was acquired. This provision clearly excludes any
possibility of re-use of this information. The second paragraph of the same
Article states the general duty of professional secrecy in charge of the Com-
mission and the competition authorities of the Member States, their officials,
servants and other persons working under the supervision of these authori-
ties as well as of the officials and civil servants of other authorities of the
Member States. 
Under Articles 27.4 and 30.2 “where the Commission intends to adopt a
decision on the investigation of possible infringement of Articles 81 and 82
of the Treaty, the publication of such decisions shall have regard to the le-
gitimate interest of undertakings in the protection of their business secrets.”
Also, under Article 27.2 of the same regulation, the right to defense recog-
nized to the parties at the hearings held within the investigation proceed-
ings cannot preclude the legitimate interests of undertakings in the protec-
tion of their business secrets. Therefore, the right of access to the file shall
not extend to confidential information and internal documents of the Com-
mission or the competition authorities of the Member States. In particular,
the right of access shall not extend to correspondence between the Commis-
sion and the competition authorities of the Member States, or between such
national competition authorities. Anyway, nothing in the mentioned para-
graph shall prevent the Commission from disclosing and using information
necessary to prove an infringement.
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This means that the private interests that the parties might have in pre-
serving their trade secrets overweight the other private interests, for exam-
ple, those derived from the right to defense. If this way of balancing con-
flicting private rights may negatively affect the right to defense, which rep-
resents one of the most important human rights and is decisive for the effec-
tiveness of justice and rule of law, a fortiori it will set aside the economic in-
terest of eventual re-users of the confidential PSI. As for the interests of the
information originators, they might be set aside, at their turn, by the public
interest that the Commission performs its public task of implementing the
EU competition policy. 
This hierarchy of interests is rather typical for the actual stage of the EU
law in respect of any trade secret to which the PSBs have access with the oc-
casion and for the purposes of accomplishing their public task. Rather than
creating added value as for other kinds of PSI, the free access for re-use of
the confidential PSI will destroy the economic value of that information be-
cause such value is essentially derived from its confidential nature. 
The adoption of such an approach is mandatory in certain fields under
the international obligations undertaken by the European Union. For exam-
ple, under the Article 39.3 of the TRIPs agreement, “Members, when requir-
ing, as a condition of approving the marketing of pharmaceutical or of agri-
cultural chemical products which utilize new chemical entities, the submis-
sion of undisclosed test or other data, the origination of which involves a
considerable effort, shall protect such data against unfair commercial use. In
addition, Members shall protect such data against disclosure, except where
necessary to protect the public or unless steps are taken to ensure that the
data are protected against unfair commercial use.”2 
It  is  interesting to remark that  even before its  adhesion  to the  TRIPs
agreement; the European Union did not choose to merely prohibit the dis-
closure of the market approval data. 
Taking  into  consideration  the  general  interest  that  the  publication  of
these data might present for the public health, the EU law does not create an
obstacle to disclosure, but only a legal obstacle to re-use. Indeed, Article
10(1) of the Directive 2001/83/EC, as amended by Directive 2004/27/EC, in-
troduced a nonretroactive, 8+2+1 formula that grants absolute “data exclu-
sivity”  for  reference  medicinal  products  for  eight  (8)  years.  Directive
2 See Skillington, G.L., Solovy, E.M., 2003, The Protection of Tests and Other Data Requiered
by Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement, Nw. J/ Int’L & Bus (24), pp. 1-52.
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2001/83/EC, as amended, Art. 10(1). The same periods of protection apply in
the case of centrally authorized products pursuant to Article 14(11) of Regu-
lation (EC) No. 726/2004. All medicinal products,  including biologics,  are
governed by the same exclusivity regime.
For products authorized by the national competent authorities, the ap-
plicant shall not be required to provide the results of pre-clinical tests and of
clinical trials, if applicants can demonstrate that the medicinal product is a
generic of a reference medicinal product, which is or has been authorized
under Article 6 for not less than eight (8) years in a Member State or in the
European Economic Area. Generic, hybrid, and biosimilar products cannot
obtain market approval until at least ten (10) years (i.e., 8+2) have elapsed
from the initial authorization of the reference product, i.e., “marketing ex-
clusivity”. However, this ten (10)- year period may be extended to eleven
(11) years, if during the first eight (8) years of granting of the marketing au-
thorization (“MA”), the MA holder obtains an MA for one or more new
therapeutic indications (i.e., 8+2+1).
This example shows that the protection of the PSI confidential informa-
tion is susceptible of two forms. One form is to create an obstacle to access
and thus to ensure the protection of PSI trade secrets against disclosure. The
second form to allow access but to create an obstacle to re-use for a certain
period of time.
Under the current EU frame the rule is to prohibit both access and re-use
of trade secrets trusted to the PSBs within the accomplishment of their pub-
lic mission. If public interest policies require an exception from this princi-
ple, then the access may be permitted but the re-use is bared for a time. In
this second case, once filed with the market authority the data cease to be
secret but instead it receives a reinforced protection, using a similar tech-
nique to an IP right exclusivity.3
As for the concrete ways in which the exclusion from access of the PSI
trade secrets is  practically achieved, the EU framework generally lets the
concern of their regulation to the “access regimes of the Member States“. 
In respect of the secret commercial information reached under the con-
trol of the EU PSBs, strict rules might be used to ensure the identification
and preservation of this information by the respective bodies. For example,
the  non-disclosure  obligation  applying  to the  EU Commission  in  its  an-
3 See also Eisenberg, R., 2011, “Data Secrecy in the age of regulatory exclusivity” in Dreyfuss,
R., Strandburg, K., The law and Theory of Trade Secrecy, Edward Edgar Publishing Ltd.
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titrust powers, as well as the practical procedure to determine its scope of
application are included in detail  in the Commission Regulation (EC) No
773/2004 of 7 April 2004 relating to the conduct of proceedings by the Com-
mission pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty.
4. LEGAL PROBLEM: HOW TO LIMIT THE REFUSE OF 
APPLICATIONS FOR RE-USE ON GROUNDS OF 
COMMERCIAL CONFIDENTIALITY TO JUSTIFIED CASES 
ONLY
The provisions mentioned in the previous section show a clear option of EU
bodies in respect of the choice to be made between allowing the re-use of
any commercial information reached under the control of a public authority
and preserving the economic value that the undisclosed commercial infor-
mation derives from the fact of being secret. The incentive to investment
and fair competition that the protection of trade secrets secures clearly over-
passes the eventual added value that the free access and re-use to such in-
formation via PSBs might bring. 
Basically there is no case in which the mere conflict between the private
interest to hold the economic information confidential and the one of freely
re-using it to be solved by the EU legislator in favor of the later. Only if
other public interest (such as creating and maintaining a workable competi-
tion in the marketplace or satisfying the public health needs) intervene, then
the interest  of  the  trade secret  holder  might  be  sacrificed.  Even in  such
cases,  if  the  information  loses  its  confidential  status,  the  re-use  may  be
bared by regimes of legal exclusivity created to compensate the investment
made by the originator of the information in order to produce it.4
The EU option in this respect is far of being singular. The same view is
constant both in the national law systems of the Member States, as well as in
other developed economies. The US, which usually serves as referential in
respect of the promotion of an open PSI policy, does not apply it in respect
of the trade secrets. Under US law, they are considered as property which
the public authorities cannot violate by undue disclosure.5
4 For economic effects of this legal framework, see Eisenberg, L, 2003, Patents, Products Ex-
clusivity,  and information Dissemination:  How Law Directs Biopharmaceutical  Research
and Development, Fordham Law review (4, 72) pp. 477 ss.
5 See Peritz, R., 2007, “Competition policy and its implications for intellectual property rights
in the United States”, in Aderman S, Intellectual Property Rights and Competition Policy,
Cambridge University Press, pp. 154-160.
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Moreover, the protection of the undisclosed information against unfair
use represents an obligation of the European Union under the TRIPs Agree-
ment.
From  the  economic  perspective,  such  protection  seems  socially  more
beneficial than a regime of free access and re-use of any private economic
information that has to be communicated to PSBs in view of allowing their
public mission to be accomplished. It grants an adequate reward for invest-
ment in producing and managing new information,  fair  dissemination of
such information and workable and stimulating competition between origi-
nators, without creating – in most of the cases – disproportionate exclusivi-
ties.
For all  those reasons,  it  seems that the current perspective of EU law
should not be put in question in its essential aspect: as a rule, the access to
PSI  which  derives  private  economic  value  from  its  confidential  nature
should be barred to re-users; by exception, only if specific public interests
require so, the confidential nature of the information may be set aside, but
in these cases with adequate compensation for the affected legitimate inter-
ests related to business secrecy. Such compensation might include obstacles
to re-use, which are limited in time, space and scope. 
From this perspective, the current wording of the PSI Directive which
excludes  from its  scope “documents  which  are  excluded from access  by
virtue of the access regimes in the Member States, including on the grounds
of statistical or commercial confidentiality” seems adequate for two reasons.
First, as a rule the confidentiality nature of the trade secrets determines, as a
rule, an obstacle to access, and not merely to re-use. In these cases, the ob-
stacle to re-use is only a natural consequence of the obstacle to access. Sec-
ond,  by exception,  the access  regime to confidential  information may be
more liberal in consideration of specific public policies. Still, even in those
cases, as a compensation for the originator of the information, some limited
restrictions may be imposed to re-use. Therefore, again, the restriction to re-
use appears as a consequence of the legal regime of access.
This provision however creates a side problem which has no solution of
principle in the EU Directive on re-use. This problem is for the PSB to iden-
tify which one of the information reached under its control is of such a na-
ture  that  it  is  entitled  to refuse  third parties’  access  for  the purposes  of
re-use. On one hand, this problem seems decisive to determine the scope of
a liberal legal regime of re-use. On the other hand, the implementation of a
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system of PSI management able to allow such identification generates costs,
the burden of which should be distributed among the interest holders in-
volved.
It is obvious that solving those issues implies determining the scope of
the Directive, not by creating a new rule to delimit this scope, but by creat-
ing procedures of applying the existing rule. This is why those rules should
be situated to a subsequent level of normative force comparing to the imple-
mented rule. 
Another point is to determine if those secondary level rules need to be is-
sued at the national level or at the EU level. The usual rule to solve such
problem is the Article 5.3 of the EU Treaty according to which the European
Union takes a certain action only if the objectives of the said action cannot
be reached to a sufficient extent by the Member States. 
The objective  of a uniform code of procedures  meant to  allow to the
Member States to exclude on commercial secrecy considerations some of the
PSI hold by their PSBs from the liberal re-use regimes would be coherent
with the general approach of the EU PSI Directive to harmonize the national
re-use regimes of the Member States. However, it should be noticed that the
exclusion of the confidential information from this approach is grounded on
the national  access regimes, access regimes which do not dispose of a gen-
eral instrument of harmonization at EU level.
A reasonable method to reconcile those two kind of perspectives over a
problem which is  necessarily situated in a bounder area between the na-
tional and the EU competence is to start with an uniform set of guidelines to
be adopted by the EU Commission regarding the good practices of identify-
ing and protecting the PSI in which private parties have legitimate interests
related to commercial secrecy.
The following principles should be included in this set of good practices:
I. An initial classification of the information should be made by the
holder with the occasion of providing information to the public
authority within its public task. If one private holder is bound to
supply a certain PSB with documents or information which, in his
opinion should remain confidential, he will submit a request for
the documents or information to be kept in confidence.
II. The request shall be reasoned and specify which part of the infor-
mation or documents is perceived as confidential. 
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III. The PSB shall also be supplied with a copy of the documents in
question  where  the  confidential  information  has  been  deleted.
This copy might serve to a more effective management of PSI.
IV. If no request is submitted for confidentiality, the PSB is justified in
assuming that the information or documents in question are not
confidential.
V. The information for which a request to be kept in confidence was
filed by the originator should be classified by the authority in two
categories: information the confidential nature of which is perma-
nent and not contentious (“certain confidential nature” such as ac-
counting evidences, lists of clients, pricing methods) and informa-
tion the confidential nature of which is  contentious or might be
lost in time (“potential confidential nature”) .
VI. When an application for access or for re-use regards information
of a certain confidential nature, the application will be rejected. 
VII. When an application for access or for re-use regards information
of a potential confidential nature, the PSB will request the origina-
tor either to authorize the application or to provide reasonable jus-
tification for the confidential nature of the information, as at the
date of re-user’s request. 
VIII. A reasonable term should be granted to the originator in order to
offer such justification.
IX. Should such justification be provided by the originator, the appli-
cation for access or re-use will be dismissed.
X. In the contrary case, the PSB should decide to accept the applica-
tion for access and re-use.
XI. This decision is notified to the originator which has a short term to
challenge it in front of a certain jurisdiction. If this jurisdiction is
administrative,  its  decisions  should be  able  to  be challenged in
court.
XII. The decision to accept the application for access and/or re-use of
information which have a potential confidential nature will not be
implemented as long as this decision is not final and binding.
XIII. The decision of the PSB to deny access to information based on its
confidential nature should be notified to the applicant who has a
short term to challenge it in front of a certain jurisdiction. If this ju-
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risdiction is administrative, its decisions should be able to be chal-
lenged in court.
XIV. The exercise of right to defense in the jurisdictional or judicial pro-
ceedings cannot breach the legitimate interests of the originator to
maintain the confidential nature of the information.
XV. Considering that maintaining this system of information manage-
ment and control involves costs that should not burden the public
budget  (data  systems,  infrastructure,  employees),  an  exception
from charging the PSI supply for re-use on marginal costs basis
might  be  justified  in  case  of  availing  information  which,  at  the
time of application, was classified as having a potential confiden-
tial nature.
5. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF … AND RELATED COUNTER-
ARGUMENT
The arguments to  sustain the proposal  of guidelines  regarding the good
practices of identifying and protecting the PSI in which private parties have
legitimate interests related to commercial secrecy are the following:
1. The  normative  instrument  chosen  has  no  direct  mandatory  force,
which allows long periods of adaptation of those good practices to
the local bureaucratic environment of any PSB.
2. It however creates premises for a certain harmonization at European
level in a field with considerable impact on the EU market from the
perspective  of  both economic  value of  trade secrets  and of  added
value that a legal environment favorable to PSI re-use should create.
3. The proposal prevents an arbitrary injunction in the legitimate inter-
est to preserve business secrets grounded on policies favorable to re-
use.
4. It also prevents excessive obstacle to re-use falsely grounded on com-
mercial secrecy.
5. The national  criteria applied by the Member States in  qualifying a
trade secret are not affected.
6. The jurisdictional control over the decision of the PSBs may be inte-
grated in larger systems of control applying to PSI management or to
administrative decisions in general.
7. The suspension of effects of a decision to grant access to information
during  the  jurisdictional  control  of  such  decision  prevents  the  ir-
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reparable harm that would be caused to the originator by the waste of
the confidential nature of the information he provided.
8. The primary effort to preserve the confidential nature of the informa-
tion belongs to the immediate beneficiary of this nature: the origina-
tor.
9. The costs of a system meant to prevent excessive limitation of re-use
are allocated to its immediate beneficiaries, the re-users, without ex-
cessive burdens on the public budget.
6. ARGUMENTS AGAINST … AND RELATED COUNTER-
ARGUMENT
This proposal might confront the following counter-arguments:
1. While  it  has no strict  normative value,  a recommendation of good
practices might be ineffective in putting to the same level various bu-
reaucratic cultures in a field where the main interests in conflict are
individual and external to the public mission of the PSB.
2. Its complexity and management costs might represent a disincentive
for the PSBs to put it in place.
3. The duration of a quasi-contradictorial system of releasing the poten-
tially confidential information might delay the re-use, while the attri-
bution of its costs to re-users might discourage it.
Those objections seem not decisive to the extent that, under the current
legal frame established by the PSI Directive, the national PSBs are already
under an obligation to refuse disclosure for re-use of the information that
are excluded from access under the national access regimes on grounds of
commercial secrecy. In order to comply with this obligation,  the PSBs al-
ready need to proceed in a certain way in order to identify the information
for which its confidential nature might serve as ground to refuse the access
and re-use.
The proposed policy recommendation simply seeks a modus operandi to
satisfy this need in the most balanced, reasonable and cost effective way. Its
inclusion in a non-mandatory recommendation of good-practices will  en-
sure a gradual harmonization at European level without breaking the conti-
nuity and adaptation to the existing practices of various national or local
PSBs.
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7. IF POSSIBLE: WHAT IS HEAVIER BETWEEN V. AND VI.? 
See the above.
8. SECOND-BEST OPTION 
The second best option would be to refrain from any change in the actual
legislative  balance  between  trade  secrets  and  PSI  re-use  and  to  let  un-
touched the  current  diversity  of  ways  to  implement  this  balance.  Those
ways generally result from established practices which are adapted to local
and material  peculiarities of each PSB and correspond to its  institutional
culture.
As already mentioned, there are not serious legal or economic reasons to
question the basic view taken by the EU lawgiver that the interest of reusing
certain economic information should not overpass the interest of not dis-
closing it, when the later interest is justified by the economic value drawn
by the information from its confidential nature.
As for the possibility of a stronger EU intervention than simple guide-
lines in order to implement this balance of interests, it seems not adequate
to the current stage of the issue. On one hand, there is no uniform access
regime at the EU level and the problem of identifying and protecting a trade
secret is  essentially a problem of access regime, and only at a secondary
level a problem of the re-use regime. On the other hand, the huge diversity
of information covered by trade secrets, of bureaucratic cultures of the PSBs
at national and local level and of administrative structures involved make it
very difficult to adopt a uniform procedure to deal with identification and
protection of business secrets.
